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ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS AND THE
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS IN THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
LENNART VERNON LARSON
It is a commonplace that administrative tribunals have multiplied
exceedingly in the past score of years. They have flourished in both
federal and state governments. Economic and social interests have
increasingly become subjects of legislation, and boards and com-
missions have been entrusted with powers of control. The theory has
been that administrative agencies, having specialized training and
experience, are more competent than courts to deal with certain eco-
nomic and social problems. World War II has not retarded the growth
of administrative tribunals; rather, it has brought with it new boards
and commissions. Emphasis has been shifted from the promotion of
social ends to the stimulation of production and the winning of a
complete victory.
A complaint frequently heard is that administrative tribunals are
not subject to judicial restraint. Of course, this is not literally true.
One has difficulty in naming a board or commission which has abso-
lute freedom to act as it pleases within its jurisdiction without having
to answer in some way in a court of law. The complaint, then, re-
duces to this: administrative tribunals are not under sufficient judicial
restraint; within wide bounds they may act as they see fit, and one
aggrieved has no remedy. Many people-no doubt lawyers are con-
spicuous among them-feel that a fuller opportunity to resort to a
court of law would give security against administrative injustice.
The purpose of this article is to investigate to what extent adminis-
trative determinations in the State of Washington may be judicially re-
viewed by use of the extraordinary writs. These writs include cer-
tiorari, mandamus, quo warranto, injunction, prohibition, and habeas
corpus. Statutory appeal is allowed from many state agencies, and its
scope will be discussed with care. Consideration will also be given to
the distinction between direct and collateral attacks upon administra-
tive proceedings. No conclusion will be drawn as to whether or not
the tendency to set up boards and commissions is to be deplored. But
light should be thrown on the question whether or not there exist ade-
quate procedures in Washington to secure court review of erroneous,
arbitrary, or fraudulent administrative determinations.
STATUTORY APPEAL
A profusion of statutes is to be found in Washington providing for
appeal from administrative bodies to the superior courts. A large num-
ber of statutes permit appeal from special assessments for improve-
EXTRAORDINARY WRITS
ments.1 Another large group of statutes permits appeal from the action
of. a board in revoking, or refusing to grant or to renew, a license to
carry on an occupation.2 Valuations of particular types of real -and
personal property for certain governmental purposes may be appealed.3
Removal from a civil service position and from other offices is cause
for appeal.4 Rights to pensions and to compensation for unemploy-
ment and for industrial injuries may be broughtto a superior court for
adjudication.5 Several appeal statutes concern the refusal to permit
incorporation of certain types of banking and investment houses. 6 A
number of statutes provide broadly for appeals from orders and de-
cisions of specified state officers.7 Not included in this rough classifi-
cation are many other statutes providing for appeal from a variety of
administrative determinations.8
In making provision for statutory appeal a legislature may go to
either of two extremes. It may declare that the appeal is to be a trial
anew of the facts and law. The court may render judgment on the,
results of the trial, giving no weight to the administrative determina-.
tion. On'the other hand, the legislature may restrict the appeal to
matters of law only: whether or not the administrative tribunal had
jurisdiction and whether or not it committed any material legal error.
In between these extremes the court may be given jurisdiction to re-
view the facts, but presumptions of different degrees may be attached
to the administrative findings, and limitations may be placed on the
introduction of evidence.
The appeals statutes of Washington are liberal in permitting judicial
review of administrative determinations. Under the great majority a
re-trial of the facts and law may be had. Almost one-half of them ex-
pressly provide for a "trial de novo."9 An equal number stipulate for
I REm. REv. STAT. §§ 2778-6, 2799, 4249, 4367, 4436, 4508, 7505-3, 9242, 9243,
9374,,9438, 9455, 9675, 9808, 9809, 11591; RPmV. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§
7464-1, 9663-10.
2 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 2860, 5853-16, 6312-74, 7039, 7090, 8340-14, 10017,
10065, 10088, 10144, 10864, 11550; REm. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§ 8306-11,
9871-13, 10031-9.
3 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 3805, 7797-111, 7797-137, 7967, 7986, 8093, 9336, 11097,
11219-6; REm. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§ 3717-95, 3836-6, 8370-199.
'1 REm. RsEv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§ 3217, 3717-18, 9558-9, 9558a-9.5 REm. REV. STAT. §§ 5018, 5020-25; REim. Rwv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §
7697-2; REm. REv. STAT. (1943 Supp.) §§ 7697, 9998-106(i).
REm. REv. STAT. §§ 3229, 3862-4; REm. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§ 3717-7,
3717-10.7 REM. R V. STAT. §§ 2906, 4076, 5065, 5068, 7361; REm. REV. STAT. (1940
Supp.) § 9663A-17.
a REm. REv. STAT. §§ 4762, 5399, 5366-5382, 6962, 7402-265, 7500, 7503, 7609,
7788, 7797-112, 7797-125, 7808-7814, 9317, 9324; RPiv. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.)
§§ 7119c, 7724.
aRrvr. REv. STAT. §§ 2778-6, 3229, 3862-4, 4249, 4367, 5018, 5020-25, 5068,
6962, 7609, 7697, 7797-112, 7797-125, 7808-7814, 8093, 9675, 10017, 10065, 10144,
11219-6; REM. REv. STAT. ' (1940 Supp.) §§ 3217, 3717-7, 3717-10, 3717-18,
3717-95, 7119c, 7724, 7697-2, 8370-199, 9871-13, 10031-9; REM. REV. STAT. (1943
Supp.) § 7697.
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a court trial or a determination as in an ordinary civil action.' Some
of these statutes declare that the trial shall be "summary," others that
the suit shall be tried as are "equitable causes." In no case has either
of these expressions prevented a full trial of the issues. Several of the
statutes make provision for a procedure similar to that of an appeal
taken from a justice of peace court to a superior court."' This leads
to a new trial.' 2 A number of the statutes provide simply for the
right of appeal, and there appears to be no limitation on the re-trial
of issues.'" The different ways in which these statutes have been
worded do not seem to have taken on any significance. The legislative
intent is clear: appellant is to have a court determination of all mat-
ters in issue-both as to facts and as to law.
Most of the appeal statutes impose no restrictions on the introduction
of evidence and attach no presumption of correctness to the administra-
tive determination. Frequently the statutes require a copy of the record
and the decision appealed from to be filed with the court,'4 but this
circumstance of itself does not add to appellant's burden in trying his
case anew. A minority of the statutes expressly require the trial court
to give consideration to the administrative determination. Some of the
statutes declare the findings of fact prima facie correct, and the appel-
lant has the burden of proof to show that the determination was erron-
eous. 5 Limitations on the introduction of evidence appear in a few
of the statutes.' 6 A small number of statutes make the administrative
20 REM. REV. STAT. § 2906, 3805, 4508, 5399, 5853-16, 6312-74, 7039, 7090,
7361, 7402-265 et seq., 7500, 7503, 7505-3, 7797-111, 8340-14, 9242, 9243, 9324,
9336, 9374, 9438, 9455, 9808-9810, 11097, 11591; REM. REV. STAT. (1940 Supp.)
§ 3836-6, 7000-4, 8306-11, 9558-9, 9558-9a, 9663-10, 9663A-17. REm. REV.
STAT. §§ 5366-5382 make provision for election contests concerning county
offices. For specified causes the superior court has jurisdiction to nullify
a certificate of election issued by an election board, and the trial is con-
ducted as an ordinary civil action. The contestant has the burden of proof.
See Moyer v. Van DeVanter, 12 Wash. 377, 41 Pac. 60 (1895); State v.
Superior Court, 62 Wash. 166, 113 Pac. 277 (1911); Quigley v. Phelps, 74
Wash. 73, 132 Pac. 738 (1913).
"REM. REV. STAT. §§ 4076, 4249, 4367, 4508, 5018, 5020-25, 7505-3, 7609,
7967, 9317, 9675, 10864.
1" REm. REV. STAT. § 1914. (Appellant) . . . shall file with the clerk of the
superior court a transcript . . ., together with . . . other papers relating
to the case ... . and upon filing of such transcript, the superior court shall
become possessed of the case, and shall proceed in the same manner, as
near as may be, as in actions originally commenced in that court ...
1" REM. REV. STAT. §§ 2799, 2860, 4436, 10088, 11550; REM. REV. STAT. (1940
Supp.) § 7464-1. See Hays v. Merchants' Bank, 10 Wash. 573, 39 Pac. 98
(1895).
14 REM. REV. STAT. §§ 2778-6, 2799, 2906, 3229, 4249, 4367, 4436, 4508. 5018,
5020-25, 5067, 5399, 5853-16, 6962, 7090, 7609, 7797-125, 7808-7814, 8340-14,
9336, 9374, 9438, 9455, 9675, 10017, 10065, 10144, 11591; REM. REV. STAT. (1940
Supp.) §§ 3717-95, 7119c, 9558-9, 9558a-9, 9663-10, 9871-13, 10031-9; REm.
REV. STAT. (1943 Supp.) § 7697. REM. REV. STAT. §§ 7797-125 and 7811 direct
that the record "except the evidence used in such proceedings before the
board" be certified to the court.
"5 REM. REV. STAT. §§ 2906, 5853-16, 7361; REm REV. STAT. (1940 Supp.)
§§ 7724, 8370-199; Rmw. REV. STAT. (1943 Supp.) § 7697.
"6REM. REV. STAT. (1940 Supp.) §§ 7697-2, 10331-9; REm. REV. STAT. (1943
Supp.) § 7697.
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findings of fact conclusive and forbid the introduction of evidence. 17
Under these statutes the appeal is solely on questions of law.
For the most part, a person aggrieved by an administrative deter-
mination in Washington has very satisfactory recourse to the courts
where statutory appeal is allowed him. The appeal is not hedged in
by conditions and restrictions as are the extraordinary writs but is a
matter of right. Under most of the statutes any relevant evidence may
be introduced, and the superior court is authorized to make a new
determination. However, there are reasons to believe that the decision
of an administrative tribunal has some persuasive effect even where
no statutory presumption has been set up.
A fuller understanding of the efficacy of statutory appeal in secur-
ing relief from faulty administrative determinations may be obtained
by considering the specific matters reviewed. Of course, questions of
law will be decided: whether or not the administrative body had juris-
diction over the controversy and whether or not it construed and
applied the law properly. A finding of fact unsupported by any sub-
stantial evidence is an error of law which will be corrected, and this
appears to be true, even though statute makes the factual determination
of an administrative tribunal final and conclusive."" Often the court
is called upon to decide whether or not a particular array of facts or
uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to set into operation a statute or
rule of law. For example, under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
judicial decisions have held, frequently contrary to the Department of
Labor and Industries, that the facts made out a "disability," or an
injury resulting from a "fortuitous event," or an injury "in the course
of employment," or an employment relation of the type protected by
the legislation. 19 Other instances where the court decides whether or
'7 REm. REv. STAT. §§ 2873, 6096, 6106, 7639, 7788, 7797-130, 8303-6, 8770;
REm. REv. STAT. (1943 Supp.) § 9998-106(i).
'
8 In re Persons Employed at St. Paul & Tacoma L. Co., 7 Wn. (2d) 580,
110 P.(2d) 877 (1941); In re Farwest Taxi Service, 9 Wn.(2d) 134, 114
P. (2d) 164 (1941); Virginia Mason Hospital Assn. v. Larson, 9 Wn. (2d) 284,
114 P.(2d) 976 (1941); In re North River Logging Co., 15 Wn.(2d) 204,
130 P.(2d) 64 (1942); Unemployment Compensation Dept. v. Hunt, 17
Wn.(2d) 61, 135 P.(2d) 89 (1943). These decisions declare that the ad-
ministrative determination may also be overturned if it is "clearly arbi-
trary or capricious." The Virginia Mason case goes a step further and
holds that the superior court may make additional material findings of
fact if they do not controvert the conclusive fifidings made by the ad-
ministrative agency. Otherwise, the agency could, by incomplete and bi-
ased findings, force the reviewing court to sustain the administrative de-
termination in every case.
1 9Zapalla v. Industrial Insurance Comm., 82 Wash. 314, 144 Pac. 54
(1914); Guerrieri v. Industrial Insurance Comm., 84 Wash. 266, 146 Pac.
608 (1915); Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Comm., 91 Wash. 588, 158 Pac.
256 (1916); Kostida v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 139 Wash. 629, 247 Pac.
1014 (1926); Brewer v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 143 Wash. 49, 254 Pac.
831 (1927); Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 157
Wash. 96, 288 Pac. 685 (1930); Dewey Fish Co. v. Dept. of Labor & Indus-
tries, 181 Wash. 95, 41 P.(2d) 1099 (1935); Dalmasso v. Dept. of Labor &
Industries, 181 Wash. 294, 43 P. (2d) 32 (1935); Jannak v. Dept. of Labor &
Industries, 181 Wash. 396, 43 P.(2d) 805 (1935).
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not the uncontroverted facts or evidence come within the meaning of
a statute or rule of law may be found. 0
A great advantage of the appeal procedures under most of the statutes
is that factual determinations may be challenged. Trial de novo means
that evidence is to be heard anew and the court is to make its own
findings of fact.21 However, in important instances a distinct burden
is placed upon the appellant to prove that the administrative action
was wrong. Without statutory warrant a presumption has operated
that the action was correct. Thus, in making assessments for street
improvements, eminent domain commissioners will not be reversed in
laying out the district specially benefited, in apportioning the cost
between the district and the general public, or in assessing individual
lots, in the absence of fraud, mistake of law or fact (but not of opinion),
or arbitrary action. 22 A person appealing can only succeed by coming
forward and proving by a preponderance of evidence the existence
of one of these errors.2 3 When appeal was allowed from assessments for
purposes of general taxation, the person taxed had the burden of prov-
ing by a preponderance of evidence excessive valuation to the point of
actual or constructive fraud.2 4 Where a county superintendent, after
proper hearing, transfers part of one school district to another, the
burden appears to be on the persons appealing to prove the action
wrong.
2 5
It is unsafe to infer from these cases that an appellant invariably,
or even generally, has the specific burden of proving an administrative
action wrong. Under the statutes providing for trial anew and saying
nothing of presumptions, probably in most instances appellant has the
same burden he had before the administrative tribunal, and no more.
If he asserts a claim or advantage, he still has the burden to prove it
by a preponderance of evidence. If a claim or penalty is asserted against
him, the burden remains with the tribunal. These conclusions appear
sound, and warranted by the language of most of the appeal statutes
However, the tendency to give an administrative finding a prima facie
20 In re West Marginal Way, 112 Wash. 418, 192 Pac. 961 (1920); Polson
Logging Co. v. Martin, 195 Wash. 179, 80 P.(2d) 767 (1938).
21 In re Littlefield, 61 Wash. 150, 112 Pac. 234 (1910); Russell v. Dibble,
137 Wash. 51, 231 Pac. 18 (1924).
22 In re Westlake Avenue, 40 Wash. 144, 82 Pac. 279 (1905); In re Seattle,
50 Wash. 402, 97 Pac. 444 (1908); In re Ninth Avenue, 79 Wash. 674, 141
Pac. 61 (1914); In re Western Avenue, 93 Wash. 472, 161 Pac. 381 (1916);
In re Aurora Avenue, 180 Wash. 523, 41 P. (2d) 143 (1935).
"Spokane v. Fennell, 75 Wash. 917, 135 Pac. 211 (1913); In re Boyer
Avenue, 79 Wash. 664, 141 Pac. 58 (1914); In re Tenth Avenue Northeast,
125 Wash. 503, 217 Pac. 28 (1923); Appeal of Johnson, 148 Wash. 140, 268
Pac. 164 (1928); In re Taylor Avenue Assessment, 149 Wash. 214, 270 Pac.
827 (1928); Towers v. Tacoma, 151 Wash. 577, 276 Pac. 888 (1929).
2 In re Metropolitan Bldg. Co., 144 Wash. 469, 258 Pac. 473 (1927); In re
Jefferson County, 153 Wash. 133, 279 Pac. 392 (1929).
"5 School District No. 88 v. Morgan, 147 Wash. 321, 266 Pac. 150 (1928);
see In re School Districts No. 12 and 133, 141 Wash. 538, 251 Pac. 382 (1927).
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correct character exists and is understandable. A court is inclined to
give weight to the findings of a body which is set up to make the deter-
mination in the first place and which has special facilities and training
to do the job. If an appellant wants to be sure of success, he should
come to court prepared to prove by a preponderance of evidence that
an administrative finding is wrong. In some instances, at least, he
must do. this to win his-suit.
Appeals from the Department of Labor and Industries in adjudicat-
ing claims under the Workmen's Compensation Act have been more
numerous than from any other administrative agency. Under the act,
no evidence other than that presented before the department may be
introduced in court; the decision of the department is prima facie
correct, and appellant has the burden of proof.2 6 Before 1939 the
verdict of the jury was only advisory, and the trial judge decided
whether or not the evidence preponderated against the department. 27
If substantial evidence supported the administrative determination and,
on the whole, did not preponderate against it, the department was sus-
tained. Since 1939 the verdict of the jury has been binding, if there
is substantial evidence to support it.28 The case must be given to the
jury if evidence has been presented on which reasonable men may have
an honest difference of opinion. The jury is instructed that the decision
of the department is prima facie correct and that it is to be reversed
or modified only if the evidence preponderates against it.29 The burden
of proof imposed in workmen's compensation cases is statutory, but it
is suggestive of what an appellant must undertake to do where the
administrative board complained of has special qualifications and ex-
perience in settling issues brought before it.
Not all administrative determinations are subject to appeal even
where statute seems to provide for it. For instace, the statute of
appeal from the board of county commissioners is very broad.80 But
no appeal may be had where the commissioners act as a board of
equalization, reduce the salary of a court commissioner, remove the
2Rz,. REV. STAT. (1943 Supp.) § 7697; Kendall v. Dept. of Labor &
Industries, 141 Wash. 481, 252 Pac. 107 (1927), affg, 139 Wash. 379, 247
Pac. 457 (1926); Boyer v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 160 Wash. 557, 295
Pac. 737 (1931).17 Eklund v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 187 Wash. 65, 59 P. (2d) 1109
(1936); Hogden v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 541, 78 P. (2d)
949 (1938); Russell v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 194 Wash. 565, 78 P. (2d)
960 (1938); Schraum v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 197 Wash. 336, 85
P. (2d) 262 (1938); Hoff v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 198 Wash. 257, 88
P.(2d) 419 (1939).
-
8 REmw. REv. STAT. (1940 Supp.) § 7697-2 (LAwS 1939, Ch. 184).
"Alfredson v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 5 Wn. (2d) 648, 105 P.(2d)
37 (1940); McLaren v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 6 Wn. (2d) 164, 107
P.(2d) 230 (1940); Darling v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 6 Wn.(2d) 651,
108 P.(2d) 1034 (1940); Summerlin v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 8
Wn. (2d) 43, 111 P. (2d) 603 (1941); Calkins v. Dept. of Labor & Industries,
10 Wn.(2d) 565, 117 P.(2d) 640 (1941).
P10 REm. REV. STAT. § 4076.
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county seat, open up or vacate a county road, grant a franchise to
erect a toll bridge, or let a contract for county printing."' One reason
given is that these are special matters not coming within the scope of
the appeal statute. Another reason is that the determination is "legis-
lative," "administrative," "political" or "ministerial" in character.
Courts must confine themselves to "judicial" controversies. Other de-
terminations are of such a discretionary nature as to render very doubt-
ful the chances of a successful appeal. Some of these are changing the
site of a school,82 rescinding a contract of sale of public lands,33 and
establishing a drainage district. 4 A board of commissioners' finding
of emergency making necessary excess appropriations is to a high degree
discretionary.1
5
A common characteristic of all these matters is that they are pecu-
liarly for the administrative body to decide. To an extent administrative
bodies legislate; they make decisions affecting an entire locality as well
as particular individuals. They also make determinations incidental
to the carrying on of their ordinary functions. In performing these
functions they must have a certain amount of discretion in determining
what should be done. Much of the efficiency and effectiveness of ad-
ministrative bodies would be lost if appeals were to be allowed indis-
criminately. Thus, there is an undefined area in which acts of a board
are "legislative," "political," "administrative," "ministerial," or "dis-
cretionary." Remedy for unsatisfactory performance of these acts is to
be had in causing new officers to be elected or appointed.
Some determinations of a discretionary nature may be overturned
on appeal. But the evidence must show abuse of discretion amounting
to fraud 8 or failure to exercise discretion, 7 and the burden of proof
is upon the appellant. It is interesting to note that what was once a
matter of discretion may become, through legislative action, a subject
of appeal and trial de novo. Before 1927, under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, the superior courts could not review an award if the
disability was correctly classified.38 Since 1927 a clause declaring
"King County v. Neely, 1 Wash. Terr. 241 (1868); Lawry v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Snohomish County, 12 Wash. 446, 41 Pac. 190 (1895); Olympia
Water Works v. Thurston County, 14 Wash. 268, 44 Pac. 267 (1896);
Selde v. Lincoln County, 25 Wash. 198, 65 Pac. 192 (1901); State ex rel.
Yeargin v. Maschke, 90 Wash. 249, 155 Pac. 1064 (1916); Adams County v.
Scott, 117 Wash. 85, 200 Pac. 1112 (1921); State ex rel. Klaas v. County
Comm'rs, 140 Wash. 43, 248 Pac. 76 (1926); State ex rel. Republic Publish-
ing Co. v. McPhee, 188 Wash. 543, 62 P.(2d) 1355 (1936).
" State ex Tel. Lukens v. Spokane School Dist., 147 Wash. 467, 266 Pac.
189 (1928).
33 Rsr. REv. STAT. § 7804; Polson v. Callvert, 38 Wash. 614, 80 Pac. 815
(1905).
'"In re Drainage Dist. No. 10, 119 Wash. 8, 204 Pac. 1050 (1922).
"State ex rel. Porter v. Superior Ct., 145 Wash. 551, 261 Pac. 90 (1927).
In re Chicago, Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co., 134 Wash. 182, 235 Pac.
355 (1925); In re School District No. 61, 139 Wash. 11, 245 Pac. 1118 (1926);
see cases cited notes 23 and 24, supra.
37In re Everett, 61 Wash. 493, 112 Pac. 658 (1911); In re Fifth Avenue,
66 Wash. 327, 119 Pac. 852 (1911).
3' Sinnes v. Daggett, 80 Wash. 673, 142 Pac. 5 (1914); Chalmers v. In-
[VOL. 20
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that "matters resting in the discretion of the department shall not be
subject to review" has been omitted from the act, and the courts have
felt free to decide whether or not an award should be increased.39 Of
course, a presumption of correctness attaches to the decision of the
Department of Labor and Industries.
In general, statutory appeal is as efficacious as any of the extraor-
dinary writs in providing relief to a person aggrieved by administrative
action. A very satisfactory resort to the courts is had: questions of fact
as well as of law may be retried. In many instances by statute or
judicial holding, an appellant has the burden of proving the admin-
istrative board wrong. However, in probably most cases this is not
true, and the burden of proof is where it was in the proceeding before
the board. At any rate, under the great majority of statutes, appellant
has the opportunity of presenting all the facts and evidence in court.
A successful appellant will secure a full measure of relief. The judgment
may direct the administrative body to do, or to refrain from doing,
certain acts. Usually the case is decided finally, but in some circum-
stances it may be sent back to the board for final action in accordance
with the judgment.
CERTIORARI OR WRIT OF REvIEw
In Washington the writ of certiorari is known also as the writ of
review. Among the statutes40 regulating the writ the following may be
set out at length:
Rxm. REv. STAT. § 1002. A writ of review shall be granted
by any court, except a police or justice court, when an
inferior tribunal, board or officer, exercising judicial functions,
has exceeded the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board or officer,
or one acting illegally, or to correct any erroneous or void
proceeding, or a proceeding not according to the course of the
common law, and there is no appeal, nor in the judgment of
the court, any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law.
Section 1005. The writ of review must command the party
to whom it is directed to certify fully to the court issuing
the writ at a specified time and place, a transcript of the rec-
ord and proceedings . . . that the same may be reviewed by
the court, and requiring the party, in the meantime, to desist
from further proceedings in the matter to be reviewed.
dustrial Insurance Comm., 94 Wash. 490, 162 Pac. 576 (1917); Whipple v.
Industrial Insurance Comm., 116 Wash. 341, 199 Pac. 455 (1921). Possibly
the award might be revised if it were clearly disproportionate to the
amount stipulated for the most closely related injury specified in the
statute. See Foster v. Industrial Insurance Comm., 107 Wash. 400, 181 Pac.
912 (1919); Taylor v. Industrial Insurance Comm., 120 Wash. 4, 206 Pac. 973
(1922).
"Johnston v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 163 Wash. 549, 2 P. (2d) 67
(1931); Bryant v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 173 Wash. 240, 22 1P. (2d)
667 (1933); Hall v. Dept. of Labor & Industries, 183 Wash. 486, 48 P. (2d)
923 (1935).
10REm. REa. STAT. §§ 1001-1012 (LAws 1895, pp. 115-117).
1945]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Section 1010. The questions involving the merits to be
determined by the court upon the hearing are:
1. Whether the body or officer had jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the determination under review;
2. Whether the authority, conferred upon the body or officer
in relation to that subject matter, has been pursued in the
mode required by law, in order to authorize it or him to make
the determination;
3. Whether, in making the determination, any rule of law
affecting the rights of the parties thereto has been violated to
the prejudice of the relator;
4. Whether there was any competent proof of all the facts
necessary to be proved, in order to authorize the making of
the determination;
5. If there was such proof, whether there was, upon all the
evidence, such preponderance of proof against the existence
thereof, rendered in an action in a court, triable by a jury, as
would be set aside by the court as against the weight of evi-
dence.
Several statutes provide specifically for review of administrative
determinations by writ of certiorari. 41 None of these adds anything
to the general statutes governing the writ.
The common law rule in this country restricts review under the writ
to an inquiry whether or not the inferior tribunal had jurisdiction and
proceeded within its authority. Neither errors of law nor of fact in
arriving at a determination may be reviewed. This rule is said to be
based on a misconception of certain English decisions.42 Nevertheless,
it is generally recognized as the common law rule and is rigidly adhered
to by many courts. In an increasing number of states, probably a
majority, the use of the writ has been extended either by decision or by
legislation. Interpretation and application of law in coming to a deter-
mination are closely related to the question of authority of a tribunal
to proceed as it did and have been passed upon in numerous cases.
Under the writ many courts will quash the proceedings below if no
substantial evidence supports a finding of fact essential to a determina-
tion. These modifications of the common law have frequently come
about because of statutory enactment.
Before 1895, when the statutory writ was provided for, the superior
courts issued the common law writ. The supreme court still issues the
writ in the exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.,' Creation
of the statutory writ did not enlarge or diminish the supreme court's
jurisdiction. 44 In most instances the common law writ has issued to
1REM~. REV. STAT. §§ 10125-5, 10428, 10439, 10441, 10523; REm. REv. STAT.
(1940 Supp.) §§ 10440-9, 11569-7.
4" Jackson v. People, 9 Mich. 111, 77 Am. Dec. 491 (1860); FREuND, AD-
MINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY (1928), pp. 260-264; HART,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1940), p. 468; SPELLING, EXTRAOR-
DINARY REMEDIES (2d ed. 1901) §§ 1891, 1915, 1949, 2018, 2019, 2023.
" WASH. STATE CONST. Art. IV, § 4.
4 Cases cited notes 47 and 48, infra.
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the superior courts. In these cases the supreme court seems to have-
confined itself to questions of jurisdiction and legality of proceedings.4 5
Expressions and holdings in the earlier cases are convincing that these
were the only questions that could be decided under the common law-
writ."6 The Washington court has taken a narrow view of the extent
of review allowed.
In two comparatively recent decisions the Washington Supreme
Court has manifested a willingness to undertake a more far-reaching
review than is ordinarily permitted under the common law writ. In one
the Department of Public Works was sustained in its action cancelling a.
certificate of convenience and necessity.4 7 In the other the department
was reversed in issuing a certificate because the facts and evidence
demonstrated that the particular area was already served by ferry
transportation. 48 In both cases unusual circumstances induced the court
to assume jurisdiction and to issue the writ directly to the Department
of Public Works. In neither case was the scope of review a contested
question, and possibly they may be distinguished in that "legality of
proceedings" was in dispute. Nevertheless, the supreme court did
scrutinize the department's findings of fact and application of law,
and the decisions are authority that some substantial evidence must
support a finding under the common law writ of certiorari. They indi-
cate that the Washington court is moving toward the modem view
of the function of the writ.
Section 1010 makes clear that the statutory writ of certiorari is to
provide a careful review of the proceedings before the inferior tribunal.
It makes clear that the review is to be more thorough than that which
is secured under the common law writ. In the first place, questions
of law are decided. In many cases involving administrative tribunals,
questions of jurisdiction, legality of proceedings, and interpretation and
'Taylor v. Ringer, 3 Wash. Terr. 539, 19 Pac. 147 (1888); State v. Su-,
perior Court, 6 Wash. 352, 33 Pac. 827 (1893); State v. Superior Court, 72
Wash. 144, 129 Pac. 900 (1913); State v. Superior Court, 91 Wash. 40, 157
Pac. 28 (1916); State v. Superior Court, 130 Wash. 464, 227 Pac. 849 (1924);
State v. Superior Court, 168 Wash. 384, 12 P. (2d) 420 (1932); State ex rel.
Turner v. Paul, 182 Wash. 261, 46 P.(2d) 1060 (1935). In some cases where
the common law writ has issued, the supreme court has referred to the
statutes governing the writ. State v. Superior Court, 116 Wash. 535, 199
Pac. 977 (1921); State v. Superior Court, 167 Wash. 481, 10 P.(2d) 233
(1932).
In State ex rel. Thompson v. Nichols, 29 Wash. 159, 69 Pac. '771 (1902),
the writ issued to the State Board of Equalization. The proceedings of the
board were sustained.
6Wlson v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 543, 27 Pac. 474 (1891); State v. Superior
Court, 6 Wash. 352, 33 Pac. 827 (1893); State ex rel. Heilbron v. Van
Brocklin, 8 Wash. 557, 36 Pac. 495 (1894); State v. Superior Court, 72 Wash.
144, 129 Pac. 900 (1913); Crouch v. Ross, 83 Wash. 73, 145 Pac. 87 (1914).
' North Bend Stage Line v. Dept. of Public Works, 170 Wash. 217, 16
P.(2d) 206 (1932).
,
8 Kitsap County Trans. Co. v. Dept of Public Works, 170 Wash. 396,
16 P.(2d) 828 (1932).
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application of law have been decided." In many cases the court has
decided whether or not undisputed facts and evidence call into operation
a statute or rule of law.50 As to all these questions the statutory writ
is as effective as the common law writ.
In the second place, questions of fact are subject to review. Section
1010-4 requires the court to examine the proceedings for "any com-
petent proof of all the facts necessary to be proved." To the extent that
some substantial evidence must support the findings, the requirement is
no different from that of the modern common law writ. Section 1010-5
goes a step further and directs the superior court to decide whether or
not the evidence preponderates against the findings of fact. Substantial
evidence is not sufficient to sustain an administrative body if on the
whole the findings are against the weight of evidence. In the absence
of statute, modern development of the common law writ has yet to
go this far.
Numerous cases have been decided in which the evidence is held
sufficient to support a determination and the court is unable to say
that on the whole the evidence preponderates against it.5 A less num-
ber of cases have held that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a
,9 Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898); Ladd v. Gilson, 26
Wash. 79, 66 Pac. 126 (1901); Everett Water Co. v. Fleming, 26 Wash. 364,
67 Pac. 82 (1901); State v. Board of Commissioners, 72 Wash. 454, 130 Pac.
749 (1913); Gregory v. County Commissioners of Kitsap County, 110 Wash.
476, 188 Pac. 761 (1920) (void procedure); State v. Herschberger, 117 Wash.
275, 201 Pac. 2 (1921) (void proceeding because notice inadequate);
Andrus v. Church, 117 Wash. 627, 201 Pac. 917 (1921); Carleton v. Bd. of
Police Pension Fund Com'rs, 115 Wash. 372, 197 Pac. 925 (1921); Public
Service Comm. v. State, 118 Wash. 629, 204 Pac. 925 (1921), 207 Pac. 688
(1922).
Errors of law leading to excessive tax assessment have been corrected
by use of the statutory writ. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 62
Wash. 409, 113 Pac. 1114 (1911); State v. Clausen, 63 Wash. 535, 116 Pac.
7 (1911); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 64 Wash. 615, 117 Pac.
495 (1911); Dexter Horton Natl. Bank v. McKenzie, 69 Wash. 314, 124 Pac.
915 (1912); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. King County, 72 Wash. 47, 129 Pac.
883 (1913).
50King v. Listman, 63 Wash. 271, 115 Pac. 93 (1911); Puget Sound Elec.
R. v. R. R. Comm., 65 Wash. 75, 117 Pac. 739 (1911); State v. Dept. of Pub-
lic Works, 119 Wash. 381, 206 Pac. 21 (1922); Pac. Coast E. Co. v. Dept. of
Public Works, 130 Wash. 620, 228 Pac. 1022 (1924); Yelton & McLaughlin
v. Dept. of Public Works, 136 Wash. 445, 240 Pac. 679 (1925); Pacific North-
west Tr. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 151 Wash. 659, 276 Pac. 566 (1929);
North Coast Trans. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 157 Wash. 79, 288 Pac.
245 (1930).
51 Ryan v. Handley, 43 Wash. 232, 86 Pac. 398 (1906); Northern Pacific
R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 57 Wash. 134, 106 Pac. 611 (1910); Puget
Sound Elec. R. v. R. R. Comm., 65 Wash. 75, 117 Pac. 739 (1911); State v.
Public Service Comm., 81 Wash. 275, 142 Pac. 684 (1914); State ex -el.
Tingstead v. Johnson, 109 Wash. 214, 186 Pac. 671 (1919); State v. Public
Service Comm., 114 Wash. 646, 195 Pac. 1015 (1921); State v. Preston, 120
Wash. 569, 208 Pac. 47 (1922); State v. Dept. of Public Works, 141 Wash.
168, 250 Pac. 1088 (1926); State v. Dept. of Public Works, 180 Wash. 278,
39 P.(2d) 603 (1934); State v. Dept. of Public Service, 199 Wash. 24, 90
P.(2d) 238 (1939); State v. Walla Walla County, 5 Wn.(2d) 95, 104 P.(2d)
764 (1940).
The court has said that a determination will be sustained although the
evidence supporting it is "meager" and "unsatisfactory." Northern Pac. R.
Co. v. Railroad Commission, supra.
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particular .determination.52 One has difficulty in finding a case in
which an administrative determination is reversed on the specific ground
that it is contrary to the weight of evidence. The courts have preferred
to base their reversals on lack of substantial evidence. The reason is
fairly dear. Courts are reluctant to say that an administrative tribunal,
entrusted with the determination in the first instance and having ex-
tensive training and experience, is wrong where substantial evidence
supports the findings of fact.
Administrative rulings on the admission of evidence may be reviewed
under the statutory writ.5 3 If incompetent evidence has been received,
the court may remand, or it may examine the record for other evidence
supporting the findings of fact. Because most administrative proceed-
ings are informal and are set up to avoid technicalities, the proof prob-
ably does not have to be strictly competent under judicial rules of
evidence. If evidence has been erroneously excluded, the administrative
body will be instructed to receive it and to make a new determination.5
A complete record must be certified to the court, and if a transcript
is undecipherable or a determination is based largely on evidence apart
from the record, a new hearing will be ordered. 5 Under the writ a
court has no means of making findings of fact apart from the evidence
in the record, and if the administrative tribunal has omitted to take
evidence and make findings, the case will be remanded.55
The statutory writ of certiorari, as well as the common law writ,
issues only to tribunals exercising "judicial" functions. For this reason
a legislative or political determination will not be reviewed under the
writ. Revocation by a city council of a license to sell intoxicating
liquors is a determination of the former type. 7 In a few instances of
legislative, administrative, or political controversy the writ has -been
granted to settle the narrow question of jurisdiction or legality of pro-
ceedings.5 But in all these cases the court has been of the opinion that
the merits were left exclusively to the inferior tribunal. Mention should
5 2 Browne v. Gear, 21 Wash. 147, 57 Pac. 359 (1899); State ex rel. G. N.
R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 60 Wash. 218, 110 Pac. 1075 (1910); Public
Service Comm. v. State, 118 Wash. 629, 204 Pac. 791, 207 Pac. 688 (1922);
Great Northern R. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 161 Wash. 29, 296 Pac.
142 (1931); State v. Dept. of Public Works, 181 Wash. 105, 42 P. (2d) 424(1935); State v. Murray, 182 Wash. 98, 44 P. (2d) 1031 (1935).
" State ex rel. Oregon R. & Nay. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 52 Wash. 17,
100 Pac. 179 (1909).
"'Carleton v. Bd. of Police P. F. Comm'rs, 115 Wash. 572, 197 Pac.
925 (1921).
State ex rel. G. N. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 60 Wash. 218, 110 Pac.
1075 (1910); Crouch v. Ross, 83 Wash. 73, 145 Pac. 87 (1914).
BePuget Sound Nay. Co. v. Dept. of Public Works, 152 Wash. 417, 278
Pac. 189 (1929); id., 156 Wash. 377, 287 Pac. 52 (1930).
57 State ex rel. Aberdeen v. Superior Ct., 44 Wash. 526, 87 Pac. 818(1906); State ex reL. Puyallup v. Superior Ct., 50 Wash. 650, 97 Pac. 778(1908); see SPELLING, op. cit. supra note 42, §§ 1899a, 1954.
's State v. Superior Court, 72 Wash. 144, 129 Pac. 900 (1913) (election
contest); State ex rel. Klaas v. County Comm'rs, 140 Wash. 43, 248 Pac.
76 (1926) (grant of toll bridge franchise).
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be made that one or two Washington statutes provide for review of
administrative orders, rules, and regulations by writ of certiorari. '
These constitute a departure from the usual function of the writ.
Civil service boards, established in a number of Washington cities,
have considerable latitude in sustaining discharges of municipal em-
ployees. Usually the discharging officer must file his reason or reasons,
and the employee has a limited time in which to request an investigation
by the board. If he files a request, he is entitled to notice of hearing
and full opportunity to present his case. Where a discharge is upheld
and the employee seeks certiorari, the oft-stated rule is that if the
reason was not frivolous and there was some competent evidence tend-
ing to prove it, the court will not inquire into the weight or sufficiency
of evidence.60 The court has observed that a city could give its officers
absolute power to discharge. To allow recourse to a civil service board
is a pure concession which may be qualified as a city sees fit. Thus,
it appears in civil service cases the statutory writ of certiorari is effective
only where the proceedings below were void, or where the cause for
discharge is frivolous, or where no competent evidence supports the
finding of cause.
Where a large measure of discretion is vested in an administrative
tribunal, its action is not easily overthrown by use of the writ. The
courts commonly say that the determination must be arbitrary and
capricious, having no support in the evidence, before it will be dis-
turbed. The Department of Public Works has wide discretion in grant-
ing certificates of convenience and necessity. It has authority to decide
whether or not a certificate should issue and which of two or more
applicants should receive it, and in case after case the department's
judgment has been sustained.6' The department is a tribunal having
broad experience within its jurisdiction, and one would expect the
courts to have confidence in its exercise of discretion.
The writ of certiorari has proved to be an unsatisfactory and inad-
equate remedy in tax assessment cases. Thirty years ago the writ was
used in a few instances to correct errors of law leading to excessive
assessment.62 But the rule now seems settled that the writ will not issue
51 REM. REv. STAT. § 3265; Rvr. REV. STAT. (1940 Supp.) § 3035-11.
6OKing.v. Listman, 63 Wash. 271, 115 Pac. 93 (1911); State v. City of
Seattle, 65 Wash. 645, 118 Pac. 821 (1911); State v. Boyington, 110 Wash.
622, 188 Pac. 777 (1920); Ford v. City of Seattle, 117 Wash. 55, 200 Pac.
568 (1921); Ryan v. City of Everett, 121 Wash. 342, 209 Pac. 532 (1922);
State v. Cotterill, 125 Wash. 533, 216 Pac. 851 (1923); Bridges v. Patterson,
135 Wash. 436, 237 Pac. 998 (1925).
61 State ex rel. B. & M. Auto F. v. Dept. of Pub. Works, 124 Wash. 234.
214 Pac. 164 (1923); State v. Dept. of Public Works, 129 Wash. 5, 223 Pac.
1048 (1924); State v. Dept. of Public Works, 144 Wash. 219, 257 Pac. 634
(1927); North Bend Stage Line v. Denney, 153 Wash. 439, 279 Pac. 752
(1929); Denran v. Dept. of Public Works, 157 Wash. 447, 289 Pac. 34, 291
Pac. 1115 (1930); North Bend Stage Line v. Dept. of Public Works, 162
Wash. 46, 297 Pac. 780 (1931); Robertson v. Dept. of Public Works, 180
Wash. 133, 39 P.(2d) 596 (1934).62 Cases cited note 49, supra.
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to correct the determination of a board of equalization.6 3 .One reason
is that where error of law or fact has been committed, the case must
be remanded to the administrative body. If in the meantime the body
has dissolved, as boards of equalization do, its action cannot be cor-
rected. The writ can accomplish nothing and is therefore refused.6'
The earlier cases have been explained in that the procedural point was
not contested and the tax collecting officers -were able to carry. out
the judgment of the court. Another reason for denial of the writ is
that injunction is a more appropriate and effective remedy, if brought
in time.6 5 In an action for injunction evidence may be presented on
the issue of excessive valuation, and the court can render a final judg-
ment on the merits. In a few early cases the writ of certiorari was
employed to overthrow tax assessments made without jurisdiction,6
but even this limited use of the writ is doubtful now.6 7
Some comparisons may be drawn between the writ of certiorari and
statutory appeal. Both provide for a direct attack upon an admin-
istrative determination. Certiorari is a remedy complementary to stat-
utory appeal in that it issues only where the latter is inadequate or un-
available. For example, the writ has been granted to review a pro-
ceeding of a board of county commissioners where the general appeal
statute was not applicable.68 Certiorari is ineffective where the tribunal
sought to be reviewed has dissolved, but this deficiency does not seem
to be true of statutory appeal. Certiorari and statutory appeal are
equally effective in affording judicial review of legal questions: juris-
diction, manner of proceeding, interpretation and application of law.
Statutory certiorari falls short of providing the extensive review of facts
and evidence permitted under most appeal statutes. Under the statu-
tory writ a court will examine the record, for evidence supporting a
determination, and it is authorized to decide whether or not the
evidence on the whole preponderates against a finding of fact. Under
the common law writ the court at the very most will search the record
for evidence supporting a determination. The court is confined to the
record where the statutory or common law writ issues, and this is a
e3 State v. State Board of Equalization, 75 Wash. 90, 134 Pac. 695 (1913);
State ex rel. Oregon-Washington R. R. & N. Co. v. Clausen, 82 Wash. 1, 143
Pac. 312 (1914); Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash.
355, 233 Pac. 922 (1925); State ex rel. N. P. R. R. Co. v. State Board of
Equalization, 140 Wash. 243, 248 Pac. 793 (1926); see McAllister, Taxpay-
ers Remedies-Washington Property Taxes, 13 WASH. L. Rxv. 91, 107 (1938).
a' Accord: Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Banker, 186 Wash. 332,, 58 P. (2d)
285 (1936) (boundary commission for flood control district had dissolved).
": See text at note 150, infra.
OLewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898); Ladd v. Gilson, 26
Wash. 79, 66 Pac. 126 (1901; Everett Water Co. v. Fleming, 26 Wash. 364,
67 Pac. 82 (1901); State ex rel. Thompson v. Nichols, 29 Wash. 159, 69
Pac. 771 (1902) (common law writ).
"7 Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Pierce County, 133 Wash. 355, 233 Pac.
922 (1925).
.s Lewis v. Bishop, 19 Wash. 312, 53 Pac. 165 (1898); State ex rel. Klaas
v. C ou n ty Comm'rs, 140 Wash. 43, 248 Pac. 76 (1926).
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point of difference from appeal procedures. Most of the appeal statutes
provide for a new trial of all issues, and no restriction is placed on
the introduction of evidence. In sum, a person aggrieved has a fuller
opportunity under appeal procedures than under the writ of certiorari to
attack an administrative determination.
MANDAMUS
The legislation presently governing the writ of mandamus (or writ
of mandate) was enacted in 1895.69 Bearing on the scope of review
of administrative determinations are the following sections:
RF-m. REv. STAT. § 1014. It may be issued by any court,
except a justice's or police court, to any inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person, to compel the performance of
an act which the law especially enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust or station, or to compel the admission of a
party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded by
such inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person.
Section 1019. If an answer be made which raises a ques-
tion as to a matter of fact essential to the determination of
the motion, and affecting the substantial rights of the parties,
and upon the supposed truth of the allegation of which the
application for the writ is based, the court may, in its discre-
tion, order the question to be tried before a jury, and postpone
the argument until such trial can be had, and the verdict
certified to the court. The question to be tried must be dis-
tinctly stated in the order for trial ...The order may also
direct the jury to assess any damages which the .. . (appli-
cant) may have sustained, in case they find for him.
A few statutes provide specifically for issuance of the writ to compel
a state officer to perform his duty.70
The modern writ of mandamus has been defined as a "command issu-
ing from a common law court of competent jurisdiction, in the name
of the state or sovereign, directed to some corporation, officer or in-
ferior court, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein
specified, which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law." 7' In substance
this is an apt definition of the statutory writ in Washington. At early
common law no issue of fact was tried under the writ. Defendant's
return to the writ was taken as true and judgment pronounced accord-
ingly. For false return plaintiff had to bring a separate action of tres-
pass on the case. If the return was proved false, a peremptory writ of
60 REm. REV. STAT. § 1013-1026 (Laws 1895, pp. 117-119).
70 REm. REV. STAT. §§ 5363, 5409, 5413.
7 1 HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIEs (2d ed. 1884), § 1. Generally on
the development of the writ and statutory modifications authorizing trial
of fact issues, see § 1-10, 30c, 448-450, 457-459, 499, 547. See also Spelling,
op. cit. supra note 42, H9 1362-1366, 1642, 1675-1677, 1687, 1688; Freund, op.
cit. supra note 42, pp. 255-260; Hart, op. cit. supra note 42, pp. 438-442.
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mandamus -could be obtained. In the eighteenth century, legislation
in England provided for trial of questions of fact. This legislation
has been re-enacted in many states of the Union and in many others
has become a part of the common law. Thus, issues of fact may be
tried under the modem writ practically everywhere.
The common law writ of mandamus, as distinguished from the statu-
tory writ, still exists in Washington and issues from the supreme court.
Article IV, Section 4, of the state constitution gives to the court "ori-
ginal jurisdiction in .. .mandamus'as to all state officers," and the
legislation of 1895 did not enlarge or diminish this jurisdiction.7 2 The
English legislation mentioned apparently is a part of the constitutional
writ because the supreme court in a number of cases has passed upon
questions of fact. However, such issues are referred for trial to a
superior court, the supreme court having no facilities to try them. 73 At
first the writ issued only to heads of executive departments named in
the constitution, but now it issues to all state officers. 74 An important
restriction on its issuance is that the controversy must be one of public
importance.75
In most cases where mandamus is sought, no administrative deter-
mination of a judicial or quasi~judicial nature is involved. Defendant
officer has no adjudicating power and is given no discretion as to the
particular matter in dispute. The meaning'of a statute may be in ques-
tion, and suit may be brought to compel him to act according to plaint-
iff's interpretation.7 6 A statute may be clear in meaning, but defendant
officer may assert its unconstitutionality, and suit may be brought to
compel compliance with it.17  A question may arise whether or not
plaintiff has proved facts' entitling him' to require defendant to act;
7 See Godfrey v. Turner, 113 Wash. 214, 193 Pac. 715 (1920).
73 State v. Ross, 44 'Wash. 246, 87, Pac. 262 (1906); State v. Clausen, 90
Wash. 450, 156 Pac. 554 (1916); State v. Clausen, 124 Wash. 389, 214 Pac.
635 (1923).
71 State v. Schively, 63 Wash. 103, 114 Pac. 901 (1911); State v. Schively,
68 Wash. 148, 122 Pac. 1020 (1912); State v. Wash. Toll Bridge Authority,
8 Wn.(2d) 337, 112 P.(2d) 135 (1941). State ex rel. Stearns v. Smith, 6
Wash. 496, 33 Pac. 974 (1893), is overruled.
.7State v. Clausen, 124 Wash. 389, 214 Pac. 635 (1923); State v. Savidge,
132 Wash. 631, 233 Pac. 946 (1925); State ex rel. Dunbar v. State Board,
140 Wash. 433, 249 Pac. 996 (1926); State v. Martin, 4 Wn. (2d) 495, 104
P.(2d) 466 (1940).
76 State v. Headlee, 22 Wash. 126, 60 Pac. 126 (1900); State v. Jenkins, 22
Wash. 494, 61 Pac. 141 (1900); American Bridge Co. v. Wheeler, 35 Wash.
40, 76 Pac. 534 (1904); State ex rel. Gillette v. Clausen, 44 Wash. 437, 87
Pac. 498 (1904); State'v. Graham, 136 Wash. 403, 240 Pac. 560 (1925); In re
9eung, 150 Wash. 289, 272 Pac. 968 (1928); State v. Wiley, 176 Wash. 641,
39 P.(2d) 958 (1934); Public Utility Dist. No. 1 v. Benton County, 185
Wash. 339, 54 P. (2d) 1011 (1936); State v. Wiley, 16 Wn. (2d) 340, 133 Pd (2d)
507 (1943).
77State v. Mudgett, 21 Wash. 99, 57 Pac. 351 .(1899); Hindman v. Boyd,
42 Wash. 17, 84 Pac. 609 (1906); State v. Carroll, 78 Wash. 83, 138 Pac. 306(1914); State v. City of Everett, 101 Wash. 561, 172 Pac. 752 (1918); State
ex rel. Mason Logging Co. v. Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 31 P. (2dY 539'(1934).
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or whether defendant has proved facts sufficient to defeat plaintiff's
action. 8 In all these cases defendant's determination not to act has
no special weight. The court hears evidence, finds the facts, and decides
whether or not the law imposes upon defendant a duty to act. The
writ of mandamus is a useful device for securing a judicial pronounce.
ment on the validity, meaning and application of a statute.
In the cases just discussed neither certiorari nor statutory appeals
procedure can be availed of for the reason that no judicial or quasi-
judicial determination has been made. The writ of mandamus is used
in the manner of a civil action to compel defendant officer to perform
his "clear" duty. Frequently his duty is not clear until statutes are
construed and facts found. But thereafter it is clear, and the act com-
pelled is said to be "ministerial" as distinguished from "discretionary."
Whether or not an officer has been entrusted with discretion or with
an adjudicating function depends upon the legislation prescribing his
duties and authority. If he does have discretion or a judicial or quasi-
judicial function, mandamus loses much of its potency as a means for
compelling action. The writ is most effective where the duty to act
is clear and there is no room for the exercise of discretion.
A leading principle governing the writ of mandamus is that it will
not be granted to control an exercise of discretion. In numerous cases
it is denied because defendant officer or board has acted within his
or its discretion. 9 In some of these cases defendant officer or board
71 Achey v. Creech, 18 Wash. 186, 51 Pac. 363 (1897); Bacon v. Tacoma, 19
Wash. 674, 54 Pac. 609 (1898); Wilson v. City of Aberdeen, 25 Wash. 614,
66 Pac. 95 (1901); State v. Cranney, 30 Wash. 594, 71 Pac. 50 (1902); State
v. McQuade, 36 Wash. 579, 79 Pac. 207 (1905); State ex rel. Reynolds v.
Hill, 135 Wash. 442, 237 Pac. 1004 (1925); State v. Okanogan County, 153
Wash. 399, 280 Pac. 31 (1929).
" State v. Bridges, 30 Wash. 268, 70 Pac. 506 (1902) (commissioner
refused to re-sell school lands); State v. Schively, 63 Wash. 114, 114 Pac.
901 (1911) (insurance commissioner's choice of newspaper in which
financial statements were to be published challenged); State v. Pratt, 68
Wash. 157, 122 Pac. 987 (1912) (attorney general refused to sue for accident
insurance premiums); State v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11
(1913) (city council abolished civil service position); State v. Fishback,
97 Wash. 565, 166 Pac. 799 (1917) (commissioner refused to grant license to
sell fidelity and surety insurance); State v. Morgan, 117 Wash. 214, 200 Pac.
1085 (1921) (county commissioners refused to repair road); State v.
Hinkle, 120 Wash. 85, 206 Pac. 942 (1922); Morris v. Favor, 134 Wash. 75,
234 Pac. 1040 (1925) (commissioners' refusal to re-district county held
"political" and "legislative"); State v. Seattle, 137 Wash. 455, 242 Pac.
966 (1926) (city council's refusal to re-build burned bridge held "legis-
lative"); Bellingham American Pub. Co. v. Bellingham Pub. Co., 145 Wash.
25, 258 Pac. 836 (1927) (city council rejected all bids for printing); State v.
Eaton, 182 Wash. 7, 44 P. (2d) 803 (1935) (method of raising funds for old
age pensions not controllable by mandamus); State v. Austin, 186 Wash.
577, 59 P. (2d) 379 (1936) (county commissioners reduced number of
deputy sheriffs); State v. McPhee, 188 Wash. 543, 62 P. (2d) 1355 (1936)
(award of printing contract "administrative and "discretionary"); State
v. Bunge, 192 Wash. 245, 73 P. (2d) 516 (1937) (parole board did not
follow recommendation of superintendent of penitentiary); State v. Civil
Service Commission, 8 Wn. (2d) 498, 112 P. (2d) 987 (1941) (classification
of employees not controllable by mandamus).
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exercises a judicial function in deciding claims or *controversies.- In
others no judicial function is exercised, but discretion is vested in -de-
fendant officer or tribunal, and the power to act may be called "po-
litical," "legislative," or "administrative." In all these cases the court
is satisfied that the legislative intent was that- defendant's bona fide
exercise of discretion should stand.
Mandamus will not be granted to compel an officer to enforce a park-
ing ordinance, saloon and gambling laws, or any other general code
of laws. 0 One reason is that the writ issues to compel performance
of a specific duty, not to superintend a general course of conduct.
Another reason is that executive officers are vested with discretion in
the manner of enforcement of statutes. A court .will not presume to
give detailed instructions as to how this discretion should be exercised.
If an officer or tribunal is under a legal duty to exercise his or its
discretion upon a matter but refuses to do so, mandamus will issue.
If the officer or tribunal exercises his or its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or fraudulent manner, mandamus will issue.8 ' Evidence will
be admitted on the question of abuse of discretion. If arbitrariness,
caprice, or fraud is proved, the case is treated as if no discretion had
been exercised. The officer or board will be directed to exercise his
or its fair discretion, and the previous action will be nullified. Often
it is said that a court will order an inferior tribunal to exercise its
fair discretion but will not direct how that discretion is to be exercised.
Nevertheless, where circumstance permit, a court will limit the bounds
within which defendant officer or board must act.82 These bounds are
calculated to prevent a repetition of arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent
conduct.
State v. Bd. of Pilotage Commissioners8 is illustrative of how a
failure to exercise fair discretion may be remedied. Plaintiffs alleged
that the board arbitrarily refused to permit them to take the examina-
tion for a pilot's license, although they were qualified in all respects.
They alleged that some persons were given licenses without examination
and that, with one exception, only union members were allowed to
obtain licenses. On demurrer the court held that the board had acted
arbitrarily and capriciously. The court did not attempt to specify
,o State v. Brewer, 39 Wash. 65, 80 Pac. 1001 (1905); State v. Carroll, 78
Wash. 83, 138 Pac. 306 (1914); State v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 142 Pac. 441(1914); State v. Landes, 149 Wash. 570, 271 Pac. 829 (1928); cf. State v.
Hill, 135 Wash. 442, 237 Pac. 1004 (1925) (city commissioners compelled to
take measures to have gasoline pumps removed from sidewalk).
81 State v. Superior Court, 59 Wash. 670, 110 Pac. 622 (1910); State v.
Maschke, 90 Wash. 249, 155 Pac. 1064 (1916): State v. Howell, 96 Wash.
163, 164 Pac. 917 (1917); State v. Fishback, 97 Wash. 565, 166 Pac. 799(1917); State v. Board of County, Comm'rs, 146 Wash. 449, 263 Pac. 735
(1928) (cf. Morris v. Favor, cited note 79, supra); State v. Bd. of Pilotage
Com'rs, 198 Wash. 695, 90 P. (2d) 238 (1939).
82 State -v. Bd. of Pilotage Com'rs, State v. Superior Court, cited note 81,
19pra.
83 198 Wash. 695, 90 P. (2d) 238 (1939).
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how the board should exercise its discretion in giving and marking
examinations. But it did order that licenses only be issued on the
passing of a competitive examination and that plaintiffs and all other
qualified persons be permitted to take the examination. Thus, the writ
of mandamus is effective to remedy glaring favoritism and abuse of
discretion by an administrative board.
In general, where a board has an adjudicating function-that is, hears
evidence and decides cases brought before it-mandamus cannot be used
to review the merits of a determination. If statutory appeal is provided
for, it must be resorted to in order to correct errors of law or fact.
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which cannot be employed where
there is a "plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law."" If no appeal procedure is provided for, certiorari is the
proper remedy to secure a court review of the merits. In a number of
cases it has been held that the evidence and facts supporting an admin-
istrative determination will not be reviewed in a mandamus proceed-
ing.8 5 This is a special case of the general rule that mandamus does not
lie to control an exercise of discretion. A board that weighs evidence
and finds facts is entrusted with discretion and, in the absence of a
clear showing of abuse, the writ will not issue.
If a board commits an error of law in making an adjudication,
certiorari is the appropriate remedy, if statutory appeal is not available.
The court can examine the record for legal errors and remand with
instructions. Except for certain civil service cases,88 no decision has
been found in which mandamus has issued simply to correct the law
interpreted and applied by an administrative board in arriving at a
determination, assuming a proper hearing has been had. Because of
the exception one cannot say that mandamus will never issue to correct
an error of law in an administrative determination. If the error is so
serious as to make the proceeding void or to render the determination
"arbitrary," "capricious," or "fraudulent," possibly mandamus will be
granted. But the general rule can be stated with assurance: mandamus
may not be employed to correct an error of law in ordinary cases.
In civil service disputes the writ of mandamus has been a favored
remedy. With respect to the merits of discharges, the rule has been
stated as follows:
s" REM. REV. STAT. § 1015; State v. Allen, 8 Wash. 168, 35 Pac. 609 (1894);
State v. Hitt, 13 Wash. 547, 43 Pac. 638 (1896); State v. State Board of
Medical Examiners, 61 Wash. 623, 112 Pac. 746 (1911); State v. S1vidge,
108 Wash. 292, 183 Pac. 111 (1919); Russell v. Dibble, 137 Wash. 51, 231
Pac. 18 (1924); State v. Board of Trustees of State Teachers' Ret. Fund, 170
Wash. 187, 16 P.(2d) 200 (1932).
88 State v. Forrest, 8 Wash. 610, 36 Pac. 686, 1120 (1894), later proceed-
ings, 11 Wash. 158, 39 Pac. 450 (1895); State v. Forrest, 13 Wash. 268, 43
Pac. 51 (1895); Hester v. Thompson, 35 Wash. 119, 76 Pac. 734 (1904);
State v. Board of Dental Examiners, 38 Wash. 325, 80 Pac. 544 (1905).
- See cases and text at notes 89-92, infra; see also State v. Bd. of Pilot-
age Com'rs, cited note 81, supra.
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"When, in a case of removal from office. or position within
the classified civil service, it appears that the appointing power
has filed with the civil service commission a written statement
of the reasons for the removal, upon charges that cannot be
said to be utterly frivolous, and when it further appears that
the commission has awarded the party charged a full oppor-
tunity to be heard, and that competent evidence has been pro-
duced tending, in some measure at least, to prove the charges
made, the court may not inquire into the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence. Its power is confined to the inquiry whether
the officers intrusted with the authority to effect removals
and discharges have acted within the prescribed rules. 8s7
The first sentence is entirely consistent with what has been said about
the unavailability of mandamus to review the merits of an admin-
istrative determination. A further reason for refusal to review the
merits of discharges is that a municipality could enact that the power
to dismiss should be absolute. a8 The second sentence raises a question.
It suggests that some errors of law may be corrected, but it does not
necessarily say that mandamus is the proper remedial proceeding.
Apart from discharge cases, civil service boards decide what applicant
or employee is entitled to a job. In making these decisions they are
governed by ordinances, their own rules and regulations, and the public
policy of the civil service law. The writ of mandamus has frequently
been used to correct errors of law in the assignment of jobs. Among
the errors corrected are: allowing seniority to a person in a classifica-
tion other than that in which he is presently employed; changing the
weights given certain questions on an examination after the papers
were graded and identified; changing the name of a position without
changing its duties in order to replace an employee; laying off an
employee for lack of work and funds where his position had not been
abolished by the city council. 89 Many others cases have arisen in which
8 State v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 64, 63 P. (2d) 515, 517 (1937). Accord: State
v. City of Seattle, 159 Wash. 392, 293 Pac. 459 (1930); State v. City of Seattle,
189 Wash. 64, 63 P. (2d) 515 (1937). The rule is the same where writ of
certiorari is sued out. Cases cited note 60, supra.
8 See text at note 60, supra.
Mandamus has been sought, unsuccessfully, to correct the action of
boards administering relief and pension funds. Such boards appear to
have complete discretion as to law and facts. State v. Board of Trustees,
93 Wash. 439, 85 Pac. 29 (1906); State v. Edwards, 161 Wash. 268, 295 Pac.
1017 (1931).
80 State v. City of Seattle, 83 Wash. 91, 145 Pac. 61 (1914); State v. City
of Seattle, 115 Wash. 548, 197 Pac. 782 (1921) (hearing denied); State v.
Listman, 156 Wash. 562, 287 Pac. 663 (1930); Allard v. City of Tacoma, 176
Wash. 441, 29 P; (2d) 698 (1934); State v. Seattle, 177 Wash. 646, 32 P. (2d)
1065 (1934) (plaintiff allowed hearing); State v. City of Seattle, 184 Wash.
560, 52 P. (2d) 360 (1935); $tate v. City of Seattle, 186 Wash. 541, 58 P. (2d)
1212 (1936); State v. Mullin, 198 Wash 99, 87 P. (2d). 280 (1939) (protest
but no hearing); State v. City- of Seattle, 199 Wash. 568, 92 P.(2d)
249 (1939) (plaintiff allowed hearing). Other errors of law were cor-
rected in State v. City of Seattle, 127 Wash. 681, 221 -Pac. 987 (1924)(hearing apparently held); State v. City of Seattle, 171 Wash. 113, 18
P. (2d) 3 (1933); Hill v. City of Tacoma, 175 Wash. 98, 26 P. (2d) 1030 (1933).
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mandamus has been employed to assert a right to a job. 0 Where the
writ has issued, the court usually finds a violation of the board's own
rules and regulations and "arbitrary and capricious" conduct.
Perhaps these civil service cases should be recognized as an exception
to the general rule that errors of law in an administrative determination
will not be corrected in mandamus proceedings. Certainly mandamus
has a special function in trying the right to a governmental position.91
However, some points of distinction may be made. In most of the
cases no hearing with presentation of evidence and argument seems to
have been had. In these cases the board can be said to have acted
ministerially, not judicially. Mandamus would then be the proper rem-
edy to compel listing of eligible applicants or an assignment of jobs
consistent with the civil service law. Even where hearing was had, this
explanation may be offered, although it is admittedly less satisfactory.
Special note should be taken that the decisions frequently add as a
reason for issuing the writ that the board was "arbitrary" and "capri-
cious" in its action. Thus, the cases are brought within the rule that
mandamus will issue to remedy abuse of discretionary power. These
distinctions may be purely verbal, but they may be the explanation for
a line of cases which otherwise are an exception to the general rule that
mandamus may not be employed to correct errors of law.
Luellen v. City of Aberdeen92 is a recent decision holding that a civil
service determination, void because of serious illegality in proceedings,
may be corrected by writ of mandamus. Plaintiff was discharged by
the chief of police because of conduct unbecoming an officer. He wrote
a letter of protest to the civil service board, but it, after investigation,
confirmed the discharge. Plaintiff had no notice of hearing and had
no opportunity to present his case. The majority of the court in a
5-4 decision held that the lack of hearing rendered the board's deter-
mination void and granted the writ of mandate to compel reinstate-
ment. To the argument that certiorari was the proper remedy, the
court answered that under it the only relief would have been a judg-
ment that the discharge was void. The majority recognized that man-
damus could not ordinarily be used to review a discharge but allowed
the writ only because the board's determination was void. The dis-
senting judges thought that the proper remedy for illegal proceedings
was the writ of certiorari. The main dissenting opinion argued that
10 State v. City of Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11 (1913); State v. City
of Seattle, 88 Wash. 589, 153 Pac. 336 (1915); State v. City of Seattle, 109
Wash. 629, 187 Pac. 339 (1920); State v. City of Seattle, 134 Wash. 360, 235
Pac. 968 (1925); State v. City of Spokane, 150 Wash. 542, 273 Pac. 748, 277
Pac. 999 (1929) (plaintiff allowed hearing); Allen v. City of Seattle, 180
Wash. 63, 38 P. (2d) 1008 (1934) (plaintiff allowed hearing); State v. City
of Seattle, 180 Wash. 635, 41 P. (2d) 784 (1935); State v. Civil Service Comm.,
8 Wn. (2d) 498, 112 P. (2d) 987 (1941). In most of these cases plaintiff was
unsuccessful in his action.
9' See text at note 98, inrfra.
_'20 Wn. (2d) 594, 148 P. (2d) 849 (1944).
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mandamus should only issue if. the removal were void at law on its
face and that where the board acted within its jurisdiction the merits
and manner of proceeding could not be questioned. While thedecision
is-weakened by the dissent of four judges, it is authority for the propo-
sitution that mandamus will issue to nullify an act based on an admin-
istrative determination which is void because of procedural defect.
Apparently all the judges were agreed that a board order void on its
face as a matter of law could be corrected in a mandamus action.
The writ of mandamus performs a function differing markedly from
that of statutory appeal and certiorari. It issues to compel the doing
of an act, and the act may be affirmative or negative in character. 93
The act may or may not be one following upon a judicial or quasi-
judicial determination. On the other hand, statutory appeal and
certiorari are proper remedies only where the determination is judicial
or quasi-judicial in nature. They are not available to review the
refusal to act of an officer who has no adjudicating power. Mandamus
is of limited utility wvhere an officer is entrusted with discretion. If
he refuses to exercise his discretion, the writ will be granted to compel
him to do so, but not to direct him how. The writ will also be
granted if proof is made that he has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
fraudulently. Abuse of discretion is the same as a refusal to exercise
discretion. Sometimes the court will limit the bounds within which an
officer or board may act in order to prevent a repetition of arbitrary,
capricious, or fraudulent conduct. In general, a court will not review
under the writ of mandamus the merits, legal or factual, of a judicial
or quasi-judicial determination. However, a possibility exists that
errors of law so extreme as to render the determination void or arbitrary
and capricious may be corrected by the writ.
(To Be Continued)
13 State v. Hinkle, 131 Wash. 86, 229 Pac. 317 (1924).,
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